







ATM SURCHARGES: EFFECTS ON 
DEPLOYMENT AND WELFARE* 
 











Corresponding author: J. Sandonis, University of Alicante, Economics Department, Campus de 
San Vicente del Raspeig, E-03071, Alicante, Spain, e-mail: sandonis@merlin.fae.ua.es, tel.: (34) 
965903614. 
 
Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
Primera Edición Mayo 2007 
Depósito Legal: V-2662-2007 
  
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to 





                                                 
 
* We are grateful to seminar and conference participants at Castellon, Alicante, UAB, EEA (Vienna), EARIE 
(Amsterdam), the Workshop on Competition and Regulation (London), JEI (Barcelona) and ASSET 
(Lisbon) for helpful discussions and comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
** I. Chioveanu, R. Faulí-Oller and J. Sandonis: University of Alicante. J. Santamaría: NERA Economic 





ATM SURCHARGES: EFFECTS ON 
DEPLOYMENT AND WELFARE 
 








This paper analyzes the effects of ATM surcharges on deployment and welfare, in 
a model where banks compete for ATM and banking services. Foreign fees, surcharges 
and the interchange fee are endogenously determined. We find that, when the 
interchange fee is cooperatively fixed by banks to maximize joint profits, surcharges 
should be allowed, as they neutralize the collusive effect of the interchange fee. As a 
consequence, ATM deployment is higher and retail prices lower than without 
surcharges, increasing consumer surplus and social welfare. 
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JEL Codes: L1, G2. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the US, when a customer of bank A (the home bank) makes a withdrawal from an ATM
owned by bank B (the foreign bank), the transaction may involve up to three prices. Bank A
pays an interchange fee to bank B. This "wholesale" price underlies a foreign fee that the home
bank charges to its customer. On top of that, bank B may directly apply a surcharge to the
cardholder. In this case, the ﬁnal ATM usage fee for the customer equals the foreign fee plus the
surcharge.1 By contrast, in many European countries and in Australia, there are interchange
and foreign fees, but surcharges are yet uncommon. For example, in the UK the three prices
cannot be charged in the same transaction.2
Both competition authorities and consumer groups questioned the role of interchange fees and
surcharges.3 In February 2006, the Italian Competition Authority started a comprehensive in-
vestigation of the Italian Banking Association (ABI) and its electronic banking unit Co.Ge.Ban.
One of the concerns was the cooperative determination of the interchange fee, which could pre-
vent competition and violate Art. 81 of the EC Treaty. Surcharges might harm consumers
who pay two prices for the same transaction.4 They may also foreclose smaller banks, since
rivals with large ATM networks can use surcharges to steal customers. Yet, surcharges may in-
duce ATM deployment increasing consumers’ convenience and also allow banks to recover ATM
1In the US, surcharges were forbidden by the main ATM networks (Cirrus and Plus) until 1996, and then they
became widely used.
2This is due to an imposition of LINK, the network that operates all the ATMs in the UK. In fact, typically,
the only price involved in the transaction is the interchange fee. Still, there are banks that use foreign fees, and
non-bank institutions which surcharge.
3See, for instance, Cruickshank (2000) or Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Consumer Commission
(2000).
4In the US, in 1999, the average surcharge was 1.26$, while the average foreign fee, 1.17$. (Knittel and Stango,
2004)
2service costs, through a direct customer-ATM owner relationship.
This paper contributes to this debate by analyzing whether a ban on surcharges can be
justiﬁed in terms of social welfare. With this aim, we propose a model where horizontally
diﬀerentiated banks compete both for banking and ATM services. We analyze the overall eﬀect
of surcharges on social welfare considering their impact on ATM deployment and prices of
ATM5 and banking services. By comparing a setting where surcharging is forbidden with one
in which it is allowed, we ﬁnd that surcharges boost deployment and reduce prices, increasing
social welfare.
The intuition of this result points to the interchange fee, which is assumed to be chosen
cooperatively by banks.6 In the model without surcharges, banks choose the interchange fee
to restrict competition either by reducing deployment or by increasing prices. However, with
surcharges, the interchange fee becomes neutral and does not aﬀect neither deployment nor
proﬁts. Therefore, it is convenient to allow surcharges in order to prevent banks from restricting
competition through the strategic choice of the interchange fee.
The collusive eﬀect of the interchange fee has been identiﬁed previously. For example, in
a model without either foreign fees or surcharges, Matutes and Padilla (1994) show that the
interchange fee plays a collusive role, and leads to higher prices for banking services. In their
setting, a bank can only obtain ATM revenues from foreign customers using its ATMs and
this reduces its incentives to attract customers. We obtain a similar result. The consideration
of a foreign fee in our model, however, mitigates the collusive eﬀect because banks can also
obtain ATM revenues from foreign transactions made by their own customers. As a result, the
5Less than 1% of banks impose "on-us" fees on home transactions. This is why we assume that home trans-
actions are free.
6This assumption is made to reﬂect the real practices in banking. It is usually the network that decides the
interchange fee.
3interchange fee has a collusive eﬀect only if it is high enough.
Importantly, in our model, deployment of ATMs not only generates ATM revenues, but also
aﬀects the market for banking services. To save the foreign fee (and eventually the surcharge),
consumers prefer to withdraw money from a home ATM rather than a foreign ATM. Thus, they
prefer banks with a larger ATM network. In this sense, the ATM market introduces an element
of vertical diﬀerentiation in the provision of banking services. Therefore, banks can use ATM
deployment as a strategic tool to increase their market share, by attracting new customers.
Most of the recent literature on surcharging (for a review see McAndrews, 2003) considers
exogenous deployment and reports ambiguous results. Among them, Massoud and Bernhardt
(2002), in a spatial model without interchange and foreign fees, but with on-us fees, show that
both the price of foreign ATM transactions and banks’ proﬁts are lower with surcharges. The
relative strategic eﬀects of competition for ATM revenues and competition for banking services
underlies this result. On the one hand, to obtain ATM revenues from customers of the rival, a
bank has to set low surcharges. The bank faces a tough competitor whose pricing home ATM
transactions at marginal cost. On the other hand, if it increases the surcharge, a bank increases
its customer base for banking services. It turns out that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates. In our
model, as well, equilibrium ATM prices and banks’ proﬁts are lower with surcharges. However,
this outcome is also driven by the interplay between the surcharge and the interchange fee.
Croft and Spencer (2004) endogenize surcharges, interchange and foreign fees in a model
where branches provide an outside option for ATM services. Surcharges are shown to neutralize
the interchange fee. Despite that, for interchange fees not too far above marginal costs, they
show that a surcharge ban lowers ATM fees.7 Importantly, in their model the interchange fee is
set by network-wide bargaining. Surcharges beneﬁt nonbanks and small depository institutions
7This is also the case in our setting for low values of the interchange fee.
4(they are their main source of revenues), but lead to a decrease in large bank’s proﬁts.
When endogenizing deployment, we depart from the typical model of spatial competition for
ATM services. We assume that banks can only deploy ATMs at exogenously given locations
called, for simplicity, shopping malls. Consumers visit any of the available shopping malls with
an exogenous equal probability. This implies that "distance" plays no role in the demand for
ATM services. Only the price of ATM services determines which consumers in a given shopping
mall use the ATM. This framework allows to study deployment in a model where all the prices
involved in a foreign transaction are considered.
Apart from our paper, Massoud and Bernhardt (2004) is the only one that addresses the
eﬀect of surcharges on deployment. They endogenize both banks’ pricing and deployment, but
allow only for account fees, on-us fees and surcharges. A key assumption to analyze pricing
and location simultaneously is that consumers receive bank speciﬁcl o c a t i o ns h o c k s .T h e yﬁnd
that competition among banks gives rise to overprovision of ATM services. In our model, we
ﬁnd that both underprovision and overprovision are possible outcomes depending on the cost of
deploying ATMs.
Donze and Dubec (2006) analyze ATM deployment decisions in a framework where the
interchange fee is ﬁxed collusively and there are no direct charges to ATM users (i.e., the
interchange fee is the only price of an ATM transaction). They build on the pervasive eﬀect
that the interchange fee may have on competition for banking services and ﬁnd that there is
overdeployment if there are many banks or consumer reservation prices are high.
Applied work mainly focuses on the potential of surcharging to shift away depositors from
small banks. Hannan et al. (2004) and Prager (2001) do not ﬁnd evidence in this sense.8 In
contrast, Massoud et al. (2006) conclude that an increase in the surcharge of larger banks may
8These results partly explain our choice of a symmetric setting, that focuses on other determinants of sur-
charging than foreclosure of small competitors.
5help them attract customers of smaller rivals.9 Few empirical studies consider the eﬀect of
surcharges on deployment and welfare. However, data seems to support a positive impact of
surcharges on the number of ATMs.10 Knittel and Stango (2004) show that surcharges induce
deployment, and increase welfare if transportation costs are high.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the model. In sections 3
and 4, we analyze the cases without and with surcharges, respectively. The eﬀects of surcharges
on deployment and welfare are identiﬁed in section 5. The last two sections unfold several
useful extensions and the ﬁnal conclusions. All proofs missing from the text are relegated to an
appendix.
2M o d e l
We consider two banks (A and B) located at the extremes of a segment of unit length where
consumers’ locations are uniformly distributed. Theyo b t a i ng r o s su t i l i t yV from banking ser-
vices. Consumers’ transportation cost is given by C(d)=d,w h e r ed represents distance. In
order to open an account at a bank, customers must pay an account fee Fj, j = A,B. The total
number of consumers is normalized to one.
Apart from banking services, banks oﬀer to customers ATM cash withdrawal services. The
marginal costs of providing ATM and banking services are normalized to zero. The use of an
ATM of the home bank (with whom the consumer has an account) is priced at marginal cost.
In order to use an ATM of a foreign bank i (with whom the customer does not have an account)
9Hannan (2005) points out that surcharging led to an increase in concentration, in favor of larger institutions.
10Oﬀ-premises ATMs increased in the US from 37,804 in 1994 to 84,000 in 1998 (Prager, 2001); Cirrus and Plus
lifted the surcharge ban in 1996.
11Focusing on nonbank institutions, Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2006) conclude that surcharges increase de-
ployment, reduce consumer surplus and do not aﬀect total welfare. In their model, ATM and banking services
are independent goods.
6the customer has to pay a surcharge si to the owner of the ATM and a foreign fee fj to the
home bank. Furthermore, the home bank pays an interchange fee a to the foreign bank. Our
assumptions on the pricing of ATM transactions are meant to describe actual practices.
Banks deploy ATMs at exogenously given locations called, for simplicity, shopping malls.
Consumers visit any of the M available shopping malls with an exogenous equal probability
1
M. Observe that this assumption implies that the decision to attend a particular shopping
mall does not depend neither on the presence of ATMs nor on their pricing policies. Banks
cannot aﬀect consumers’ decision on where to buy, though they can aﬀect the payment method
chosen. Once at a shopping mall, consumers require ATM services that can only be satisﬁed at
that mall. Changing location is assumed to be prohibitively costly. Consumers’ valuation of an
ATM withdrawal at a shopping mall is denoted by v,w h e r ev is a random draw from a uniform
distribution on [0,1].
We analyze the following six stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, banks cooperatively choose
the interchange fee to maximize industry proﬁts. In the second stage, banks decide in which
shopping malls to deploy an ATM. The cost of deploying an ATM is denoted by k, where k ≥ 0.
In the third stage, banks set the account fees. In the fourth stage, consumers choose a bank
where to open an account. In stage ﬁve, banks set the surcharge (if allowed) and the foreign fee.
In the ﬁnal stage, each consumer goes to the shopping mall, observes her realization of v and
decides whether to use an ATM (if available) or not.
We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the model by backward induction.
We ﬁrst analyze the case where surcharges are banned and then extend the model to allow for
surcharges.
73 The Case without Surcharges
In the last stage, if a customer ends up in a shopping mall with an ATM of the home bank,
she uses that ATM since it is free of charge. However, if the customer is at a shopping mall
with a stand-alone ATM of the foreign bank, she uses the cash dispenser if her valuation of a
withdrawal exceeds the ATM fee, that is, if v ≥ fj.
In stage ﬁve, foreign fees play a role only in shopping malls with stand-alone ATMs. Let
x be the market share of bank A. Given that the use of a home bank ATM does not generate
proﬁts, banks choose the foreign fee to maximize the proﬁts they make at the shopping malls




(1 − fA)(fA − a),
πB =( 1− x)
NA
M
(1 − fB)(fB − a),
where Ni represents the number of shopping malls with an stand-alone ATM belonging to bank





. Observe that when a ≥ 1,n oc o n s u m e ru s e sa n
ATM. Therefore, we focus on cases where a<1.
In stage 4, consumers decide where to open an account.12 They have to compare their
expected utility of opening an account at each bank. For a consumer located at x,t h e s ea r e
given respectively by:





































are the probabilities of ending up at a mall with a home and at a mall with
12We assume that V is high enough so that the market is covered in equilibrium.
8a stand-alone foreign ATM, respectively;
1
2
is the expected utility in a shopping mall with an
ATM of the home bank and
(1 − a)2
8
is the expected utility in a shopping mall with a stand-
alone foreign ATM. Observe that the ﬁr s tt h r e et e r m si n( 1 )a n d( 2 )c o m ef r o mg e n e r a lb a n k i n g
services, whereas the last terms come from ATM services.
Equating (1) and (2), we obtain:
(3 − a)(1 + a)(NA − NB)
8M
− x − FA = −(1 − x) − FB. (3)
This expression makes clear that, despite the symmetry in the banking service market, the
ATM market introduces an element of vertical diﬀerentiation: banks oﬀer diﬀerent ATM services.
The magnitude of the vertical diﬀerentiation is captured by the ﬁrst in (3). The "quality" of
the overall services of bank A increases in (NA − NB). The reason is that consumers prefer to
withdraw cash from a home ATM (at zero cost) than from a stand-alone foreign ATM (at cost
1+a
2
). This preference for home ATMs is increasing in a, because the foreign fee increases with
a.
The ﬁrst term in expression (3) has also strong implications on the deployment decisions of
banks. For given account fees, in order to provide a relatively better service, bank A can either
increase its number of stand-alone ATMs (increase NA) or increase its number of overlapping
ATMs (decrease NB). Either way leads to the same marginal increase in quality.
From (3), we obtain the demand for bank A:
x =
1 − FA + FB
2
+
(3 − a)(1 + a)(NA − NB)
16M
. (4)
In the third stage, banks choose the account fee to maximize proﬁts:
ΠA = xFA + πATM
A ,
where the ﬁrst term captures the revenues of providing banking services, and the second term












The ﬁrst term of this expression captures the revenues (net of the interchange fee) from own
customers that use foreign ATMs and the second the revenues from the interchange fee coming
from the use of foreign ATMs by customers of the rival bank.
The ﬁrst order condition shows how the marginal proﬁtability in the ATM market aﬀects
the choice of the account fees:
∂ΠA
∂FA










Observe that the ﬁrst two terms correspond to the marginal revenue from bank services and
the last term to the marginal revenue from ATM services. The eﬀe c to ft h eA T Mm a r k e to n


















This expression represents the marginal proﬁtability, in the ATM market, of attracting one
more depositor for bank A. It is the incremental proﬁt generated by a new customer (that is,
f∗





A). If, instead, this customer joined bank B, she would
generate proﬁts a whenever she ends up in a shopping mall with a stand-alone foreign ATM and




















10The ATM market induces higher (lower) account fees if the sign of (6) is negative (positive).
Notice that an increase in a decreases the second term in expression (6). Then, it is positive for
low values of a and negative for high values of a. In the particular case of symmetric deployment











The expression (7) is positive (negative) for a<(>)1
3.
Padilla and Matutes (1994) show that the interchange fee can be used as a collusive device
to raise the prices of banking services. Donze and Dubec (2006) also report this collateral eﬀect
of the interchange fee. They study ATM deployment in a model where customers make use of
ATMs free of charge and banks set an interchange fee. Interestingly, in our model, where the
interchange fee can be recovered by consumers through the foreign fee, only high interchange
fees support collusion.
The equilibrium values of the account fees are given by:
Fj =1+
(1 + (14 − 11a)a)Nj − (7 − (10 − 7a)a)Ni
24M
(8)
i,j = A,B j 6= i.
Note that the account fee of a bank j is increasing in Nj and decreasing in Ni.B a n k sw i t h
more ATMs oﬀer a higher quality and can aﬀord to raise the price of their banking services.
As a simple benchmark, notice that without an ATM market, account fees would be equal
to 1. This follows from (8) when NA = NB =0 . The comparison with the equilibrium value
in our model is not straightforward because the ATM market has two eﬀects on the market
for depositors: on the one hand, it aﬀects vertical diﬀerentiation; on the other hand, it aﬀects
the degree of competition. However, things become clear when we eliminate the ﬁrst eﬀect by




(−6+( 2 4− 18a)a).( 9 )
Observe that Fj > 1 only if a ∈ (1/3,1),t h es a m ev a l u e so fa for which (7) is negative,
which implies that increasing the number of customers would reduce the proﬁts from the ATM
market.
Another important diﬀerence between our paper and Padilla and Matutes (1994) and Donze
and Dubec (2006) is that the account fee is not always increasing in a. The reason is that (7)
does not always decrease with a. In particular, it decreases for a<2
3 and it increases for a>2
3.
So, the account fee (9) increases for a<2
3 and decreases for a>2
3.
Knowing the optimal account fees, we can solve the second stage in which deployment is
decided. At this stage, each bank chooses the number of ATMs to install and their location.
Given that all locations are ex-ante identical, the deployment problem is rather simple. For
ﬁrm i, this decision reduces to the choice of Ni and Ci, the number of stand-alone ATMs and
the number of overlapping ATMs respectively, given the total number of ATMs installed by the





(1 + a(14 − 11a))Ni − (1 + a)2(Tj − Ci)
24M
+
(1 + a)2(Ni − (Tj − Ci))2
1152M2 − k(Ni + Ci)
s.t. 0 ≤ Ni ≤ M − Tj and 0 ≤ Ci ≤ Tj.
Observe that Ci = Cj. Note also that installing a stand-alone ATM is more proﬁtable than






). In terms of vertical diﬀerentiation in
the banking service market, both an additional stand-alone ATM and an additional overlapping
ATM generate the same marginal increase in quality (see expression 3). But, in the ATM
12market, a stand-alone ATM not only attracts own customers (like an overlapping ATM), but






only when a =0 ,a n d
foreign customers do not generate revenues.
As the proﬁt function of ﬁrm i is convex with respect to Ni and Ci, banks have only three
possible optimal deployment strategies:13
a) no deployment: to install no ATM;
b) stand-alone deployment: to install an ATM in every empty shopping mall;
c) full deployment: to install an ATM in every shopping mall.
This implies that there can only be three types of equilibria: no deployment, full deployment
(every bank installs one ATM in every shopping mall) and stand-alone deployment (one bank
installs t ≤ M ATMs, the other bank installs M −t ATMs and no shopping mall has more than
two ATMs).
The following two calculations allow us to determine the equilibrium. First, "no deployment"
is a best response to "no deployment" only when
Πi(M,0,0) − Πi(0,0,0) < 0 or (k>k(a)).( 1 0 )
Second, "full deployment" is a best response when the competitor deploys M ATMs only if
Πi(0,M,M) − Πi(0,0,M) > 0 or (k<k (a)).( 1 1 )
Actual expressions of k(a) and k(a) are relegated to the Appendix. For the argument, we only
need to know that k(a) < k(a).
When (10) holds, no deployment is an equilibrium. Full deployment is not an equilibrium,
because (11) does not hold. Existence of a stand-alone equilibrium depends on k.C o n s i d e r a






.O b s e r v e t h a t f o r t h e










> 0, we know that if
overlapping an ATM is optimal, installing a stand-alone ATM is also proﬁtable.
13candidate equilibrium in which one bank installs t ATMs and the other bank installs M − t
ATMs. Then, optimality of the chosen strategy requires that
Πi(M − t,0,t) − Πi(0,0,t) > 0 or (k<e k(t)).( 1 2 )
However, condition (12) is incompatible with condition (10), because e k(t) ≤ e k(0) = k(a). Then,
if k>k(a), there is no stand-alone equilibrium.
When (11) holds, full deployment is an equilibrium. No deployment is not an equilibrium
because (10) does not hold. Existence of a stand-alone equilibrium depends on k. It should be
the case that the bank prefers to install M − t ATMs to full deployment:
Πi(M − t,t,t) − Πi(M − t,0,t) < 0 or (k>b k(t)).( 1 3 )
However, condition (13) and condition (11) are incompatible, because b k(t) ≥ b k(M)=k(a).
Then, if k<k (a), there is no stand-alone equilibrium.
For k(a) ≥ k ≥ k(a), by construction, one bank monopolizing the ATM services in all
shopping malls is an equilibrium. There may be other equilibria, but in all of them there are M
stand-alone ATMs. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 1 At equilibrium,
-i fk>k(a), no ATM is deployed;
-i fk(a) ≥ k ≥ k(a), there are M stand-alone ATMs;
-i fk(a) >k , there are 2M overlapping ATMs.
Figure 1 depicts the threshold functions k(a) and k(a). They divide the (k,a) space into
three diﬀerent regions. Above k(a), no ATM is deployed in equilibrium (region A). Between k(a)
and k(a), there are M stand-alone ATMs (region B). Finally, below k(a),t h e r ea r e2 MA T M s
(region C).
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Figure 1: Deployment Regions
The evolution of the number of ATMs with respect to the deployment cost is quite abrupt.
It jumps from 2M to M and then from M to 0. This result is driven by the fact that all
shopping malls are visited with equal probability. In Section 6, we allow for asymmetries in the
probabilities of going to the shopping malls, and show that, in this case, the number of ATMs
moves smoothly with the deployment costs.
In the ﬁrst stage, banks cooperatively set the interchange fee in order to maximize joint prof-
its. When computing the optimal interchange fee, we assume that all ATMs are deployed by the
same bank whenever the equilibrium involves M stand-alone ATMs. Amongst the conﬁgurations
with M stand-alone ATMs, this is indeed the one that maximizes joint proﬁts.
The interchange fee plays a crucial role in ATM deployment: consider, for example, the value
k0 in Figure 1. By increasing the value of a, the number of ATMs increases in equilibrium, going
from no deployment to M ATMs and then to full deployment.
The interchange fee also aﬀects the joint proﬁts whenever there are M ATMs. Joint proﬁti s
maximized at a =0 .52. Whenever this interchange fee induces full deployment, ﬁrms prefer to
15choose the highest a that induces an equilibrium with M ATMs. This threshold is given by a(k),
a n di ti si m p l i c i t l yd e ﬁned by k(a)=k. Note that under no deployment and full deployment, the
interchange fee plays no role because there are no foreign transactions. Clearly, joint proﬁts are
higher under no deployment than under full deployment. In both cases, there are neither ATM
revenues nor vertical diﬀerentiation generated by the ATM market, but under no deployment
there are no deployment costs. Thus, it is enough to compare no deployment and stand-alone
deployment.
In Figure 1, notice that for k<k (0), the interchange fee makes no diﬀerence and there is full
deployment in equilibrium. For k(0) ≤ k<k(0), there is no equilibrium without deployment.
Therefore, ﬁrms choose a = a(k) to induce stand-alone deployment. For higher values of k,
ﬁrms compare the proﬁts under no deployment and stand-alone deployment. The latter yields
higher proﬁts for intermediate values of k. For high values of k, deployment is so expensive
that it is not proﬁtable. In this case, the optimal interchange fee is not uniquely determined:
any suﬃciently low interchange fee that induces no deployment is indeed optimal (e.g. a∗ =0 ).
For low values of k, a(k) is so low that neither vertical diﬀerentiation nor ATM revenues are
important enough to make deployment proﬁtable.
Next proposition presents the optimal interchange fee and the corresponding equilibrium
deployment. The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 2 Optimal interchange fee and equilibrium deployment. If 0 ≤ k<k (0),b o t h
banks install an ATM in every shopping mall regardless of a.I fk(0) ≤ k ≤ k(0) or 0.05
M ≤ k ≤
0.13
M ,w h e r ek(0) < 0.05
M , the optimal interchange fee is a∗ =m i n {a(k),0.52} and there are M
stand-alone ATMs. If k(0) ≤ k<0.05
M or k>0.13
M , the optimal interchange fee is a∗ =0and no
ATM is deployed.
Importantly, the interchange fee is not monotonic in k. It jumps down when banks want to
16reduce deployment by switching from an equilibrium with M ATMs to an equilibrium with no
deployment. On the other hand, the interchange fee increases with k when banks have incentives
to deploy M ATMs and joint proﬁts are increasing in a.O b s e r v e t h a t a(k) increases with k.
This result diﬀers from the one in Donze and Dubec (2006). They study ATM deployment in
a model where customers make use of ATMs free of charge and banks set an interchange fee.
They obtain that the optimal interchange fee decreases with k. This is because, in their model,
the account fee is increasing in the interchange fee, and this makes the participation constraint
of consumers binding in the optimal interchange fee. Hence, as the cost of deployment increases,
the optimal number of ATMs decreases and banks have to compensate customers by reducing
the interchange fee.
4 The Case with Surcharges
Consider the same setting with the diﬀerence that a customer that uses a foreign ATM pays
a surcharge (si)t ot h ef o r e i g nb a n ki. The surcharge provides a new source of revenues and
changes banks’ incentives to deploy ATMs. As before, in the last stage, if a customer of bank j
ends up in a shopping mall with a home bank ATM, she uses that ATM. If she visits a mall with
a stand-alone ATM of bank i, she uses the ATM if v>f j + si. Observe that, with surcharges,
the ﬁnal ATM usage fee for the customer equals the foreign fee plus the surcharge. In stage ﬁve,
surcharges and foreign fees play a role only in shopping malls with stand-alone ATMs. At a
shopping mall with a stand-alone cash dispenser of bank A, the demand of bank B’s customers





(1 − sA − fB),
where x is the market share of bank A.
Then, the proﬁts from ATM services obtained by the banks at this shopping mall are given
17respectively by:





(1 − sA − fB) and (14)





(1 − sA − fB).



















One important implication of this result is that the interchange fee plays no role in this
case.14 The cost of an ATM transaction for a customer is 2
3, the revenue of the ATM owner is 1
3
and the revenue of the home bank is also 1
3. They do not depend on the interchange fee, and this
makes the ﬁrst stage irrelevant. This result is in sharp contrast with the one we obtain when
surcharges are forbidden. The interchange fee facilitates collusion if surcharges are banned. The
foreign fee mitigates the collusive eﬀect, restricting the range of interchange fees that support
collusion. However, a foreign fee together with a surcharge fully eliminate the collusive eﬀect of
the interchange fee.
It is intuitive that the neutrality of the interchange fee is not due to our linear demand
structure, but to the fact that what banks actually choose is the revenue per transaction (s0
i =
si + a and f0



















Therefore, the equilibrium values of s0
i and f0
j do not depend on a.
14Notice that we allow for negative surcharges.
18Note also that the equilibrium price of an ATM withdrawal and the related proﬁts equal the
ones that would obtain were surcharges banned and interchange fee set to 1
3. Recall from Section
3 that, in the case without surcharge, a = 1
3 is the threshold interchange fee that makes a bank
indiﬀerent between an additional own depositor and an additional foreign depositor.
The results from the remaining stages can be obtained from the previous section by setting
a = 1
3. The thick vertical line in Figure 1 captures equilibrium deployment when surcharges
are allowed. In this case deployment is non-increasing in its cost, k. For small values of k there
is full deployment; for intermediate values of k, there are M stand-alone ATMs at equilibrium
and, when k is high, no ATM is deployed.
5T h e e ﬀect of surcharges on deployment and welfare
5.1 Deployment comparison
Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀect of surcharges on deployment. It plots deployment in three diﬀerent
s c e n a r i o sa saf u n c t i o no fk. The dotted line represents deployment when the interchange fee is
set to maximize social welfare (see Lemma 1 in the appendix for the derivation of the socially
optimal interchange fee); the striped line shows the equilibrium deployment without surcharges
and the full line the equilibrium deployment with surcharges.
First, notice that banks install (weakly) more ATMs when surcharges are allowed. The
reason is that, with surcharges, the interchange fee is neutralized. However, without surcharges,
the interchange fee has an eﬀect not only on ATM revenues, but also on the deployment decisions
of banks. With surcharges, deployment is determined non-cooperatively by banks in the second
stage of the game. In this case, deployment by bank i imposes a negative externality on bank
j, reducing its proﬁts. Without surcharges, however, banks indirectly determine deployment










Figure 2: ATM Deployment
internalize the negative externality, leading to a reduction in deployment.
Note also that the full line (deployment with surcharge) approximates much better the “so-
cially” optimal deployment (dotted line) than the striped one (deployment without surcharge).
This conveys the main intuition for the result below that social welfare is higher under surcharg-
ing.
5.2 Welfare comparison
In order to derive welfare results, we ﬁrst spell out the welfare function as the sum of consumers’
gross utility from banking services (V ), consumer surplus derived from ATM services (CSATM),
bank revenues generated by ATM transactions (RATM), minus costs of ATM deployment (CATM)
and transportation cost incurred by consumers when choosing the bank (TC):
W = V +( CSATM + RATM) − (CATM + TC).
Consumer surplus from ATM services is aﬀected both by ATM deployment and surcharging.














When a consumer of bank j is in a shopping mall with an ATM of her bank, which happens
with probability Tj/M,she gets an expected payoﬀ of 1/2. With probability Ni/M, where j 6= i,
the consumer visits a mall where there is only a foreign ATM. Then, she makes a withdrawal
with probability (1 − a)/2, and gets an expected payoﬀ of (1 − a)/4.
Bank revenues from ATM services also depend on both deployment and the surcharging





0 if TA + TB =2 M or TA + TB =0 ,
(1−a2)(23−a(2+a))
192 if TA + TB = M.
(16)
Only stand-alone ATMs generate direct revenues. Then, RATM 6=0only in equilibria with M
ATMs (under stand-alone deployment).
Under surcharging, consumer surplus and bank revenues follow from (15) and (16), respec-
tively, by setting a = 1
3.






(1 − y)dy =
1+2 x2 − 2x
2
,
when the indiﬀerent consumer is located at distance x from bank A. Obviously, the location of
the indiﬀerent consumer depends on equilibrium prices and deployment.
Direct comparisons of welfare in both scenarios lead to the following policy implications.
Proposition 3 Surcharges reduce proﬁts, increase consumer surplus and, overall, they increase
social welfare.
Surcharges neutralize the eﬀect of the interchange fee on deployment and prices. The greater
ﬂexibility that banks have without surcharges is always used against the social interest. For
21some values of k, banks reduce the interchange fee in order to reduce deployment, which harms
consumers. Figure 2 oﬀers a paradigmatic example for k ∈ [0.04
M , 0.07
M ]. For these values, with
surcharges there is full deployment at equilibrium. This is the worst situation for banks and
the best for consumers as they do not have to pay any fee for ATM services. In contrast,
without surcharges, banks set a low interchange fee to reduce deployment. For other values
of k, banks choose a high interchange fee to collude on prices and not to aﬀect deployment.
For example, when k ∈ (0.07
M , 0.13
M ], both surcharging regimes lead to the same deployment
equilibrium. However, social welfare is lower without surcharges because the interchange fee is
greater than 1
3, so that the foreign fee is higher than with surcharges.
6E x t e n s i o n s
Our model has two particularly important features, competition between banks and lack of
commitment in the choice of ATM prices. The latter is linked to the more tractable sequence of
moves we consider, where customer bases are determined prior to the choice of ATM fees. Both
these elements aﬀect the deployment decisions and equilibrium pricing. Competition induces
banks to overlap rival ATMs in order to increase vertical diﬀerentiation and leads to ineﬃciently
high investments in deployment. Lack of commitment, on the other hand, eventually results
in higher ATM fees, reduces the number of foreign ATM transactions and consumer surplus.
Unlike competition, lack of commitment is controversial on empirical grounds. To disentangle
the relative eﬀects of competition and commitment on eﬃciency, we try to isolate each of them
in simpler settings.
To focus on the eﬀects of competition we compare a version of the benchmark model with
competition and with commitment with two alternative models without competition and with
commitment. In the version of the benchmark model with commitment, we allow banks to si-
22multaneously choose account fees and ATM transaction fees (in stage 3). Then, banks commit
to ATM prices before customers choose where to open an account. As a model without com-
petition, ﬁrst, consider a monopoly bank that owns both branches. There are no foreign ATM
transactions, and withdrawals are priced at (zero) marginal cost. Then, deployment is eﬃcient:
an ATM is installed whenever its cost is lower than the expected consumer surplus that it gen-
erates. Second, consider as an alternative, two banks that simultaneously choose deployment,
account fees and ATM fees to maximize joint industry proﬁts. They have the ability to commit
to ATM prices and there is no competition. First best deployment also emerges in this stylized
collusive model. In contrast, the version with competition and commitment of the benchmark
model (without surcharges) delivers a region of underdeployment (for high deployment cost) and
another of overdeployment (for low deployment cost). Both under- and overdeployment stem
from surplus appropriability. Competition obstructs appropriation of ATM market surplus.
This makes deployment unattractive, when dispenser costs are high, or triggers overlapping in a
vertical diﬀerentiation attempt, when ATM costs are low. Thus, competition leads to ineﬃcient
deployment even when banks can commit to ATM prices.
A comparison between our benchmark model (without commitment and with competition)
and the above-mentioned version with commitment and competition reveals the role of commit-
ment. Commitment to ATM prices, that is, simultaneous choice of account and ATM fees works
as a two-part tariﬀ contract: foreign fees are set at marginal cost (equal to interchange fee) and
surplus is extracted through the account fee. With commitment, ATM fees are lower.15 Also, the
overdeployment region shrinks, because lower foreign transaction prices decrease the incentives
15The same is true in the stylized collusive setting. In contrast, in the version without commitment (where ATM
prices are set once customers are locked-in) ATM fees exceed marginal cost and lead to an eﬃciency loss as some
users are excluded from the market. A similar ineﬃciency source probably conjoins, in our model, appropriability
problems, and creates the underdeployment region.
23to overlap. The loss of consumer surplus reduces, and more surplus from foreign transactions
can be extracted. The relative size of stand-alone deployment regions with and without commit-
ment depends on the interchange fee (with commitment is larger for higher values of the fee and
smaller for lower values, see Figure 3 in the Appendix). Stand-alone deployment generates two
sources of revenue: on the one hand, it improves surplus extraction by increasing vertical diﬀer-
entiation; on the other hand, it yields the interchange fee for every foreign transaction. Vertical
diﬀerentiation builds on diﬀerences in the prices of a home and foreign ATM transaction. Thus,
it is higher without commitment. Revenues from interchange fee are higher with commitment,
because the foreign fee is lower, and more consumers make foreign transactions. It follows that
the eﬀect of commitment on the incentives to deploy stand-alone’s depends on the trade-oﬀ be-
t w e e nt h e s eo p p o s e de ﬀects. The stand-alone deployment area is larger (and thus closer to the
socially optimal one) with commitment than without if and only if the interchange fees is high
enough. In eﬀect, with competition, commitment does not resolve the ineﬃciency. However, it
reduces the overdeployment region (mitigates duplication) and, for high enough interchange fee,
also the underdeployment one (softens appropriability problems).
In the remainder of this section, we generalize the model in two diﬀerent directions. First,
we introduce asymmetries between banks. Second, we allow for asymmetric shopping malls.
The ﬁrst extension alleviates the problem of multiplicity of equilibria in the deployment stage,
while the second eliminates the bang-bang nature of the deployment equilibrium.
Asymmetries between banks allow for the possibility that consumers value more the bank
services of one institution. Consider a situation where banks are exogenously vertically diﬀeren-
tiated and there are no surcharges. Vertical diﬀerentiation has the well-known eﬀect of increasing
the market share and the account fee of the favorite bank (say, bank A). It is more interesting,
however, its eﬀect on the incentives to deploy ATMs. The important insight is that vertical
24diﬀerentiation increases bank A’s marginal proﬁtability of installing ATMs while reducing that
of the competitor. Hence, a bank that starts with an initial advantage has higher incentives
than the less preferred one to invest in diﬀerentiation (by deploying ATMs). In consequence,
when banks are asymmetric enough, the multiplicity of equilibria for intermediate values of the
deployment cost disappears: the ATM market is monopolized by the favourite bank. In this
sense, such model gives rise to persistence of leadership. In a nutshell, when banks are vertically
diﬀerentiated, the favorite bank extends its dominance from the market for bank services to
the market for ATM services. This prediction of the model is in agreement with the observed
correlation between banks’ shares in both markets. A formal derivation is relegated to the
Appendix.
The second extension allows for asymmetries in the probability that consumers visit the
shopping malls. This generalization eliminates the bang-bang nature of the deployment equi-
librium. We obtain that the number of ATMs deployed varies smoothly with respect to the
deployment cost. As the latter decreases, banks gradually install ATMs in diﬀerent shopping
malls. In the Appendix, we formalize the case with 2 shopping malls and where surcharges are
allowed.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Since 1996, when the ban on ATM surcharges was lifted by Cirrus and Plus in the USA, sur-
charges have been the object of debate among consumer groups and competition authorities.
A popular opinion among consumers is that surcharges are an unfair double dip.16 This paper
tries to clarify the eﬀect of surcharges on welfare using a model where banks compete both for
banking and ATM services. We compare a situation where ATM owners can impose a surcharge
16See, for instance, http://www.nypirg.org/consumer/atm/surchargeunfairness.html.
25on foreign customers with one where surcharges are banned. Unlike the existing literature, when
focusing on the interaction among surcharges, foreign fees and interchange fees, we endogenize
ATM deployment. We conclude that surcharges should be permitted, if the interchange fee
is cooperatively determined to maximize joint proﬁts. Surcharging induces ATM deployment,
increases consumer surplus, and also total welfare, although it reduces joint proﬁts. The reason
is that a foreign fee together with a surcharge make the interchange fee neutral, whereas if sur-
charges are banned the interchange fee is pervasively used to harm consumers either by reducing
deployment or by increasing prices. Under a surcharging ban, competition authorities should
pay careful attention to the way in which the interchange fees are determined in the market.
This paper focuses on depository institutions and does not consider nonbank ATM service
providers. It would be interesting to know how the interchange fee neutrality and our welfare
results are aﬀected by their presence.
268A p p e n d i x
The upper and lower thresholds, k(a) and k(a), take the following form:
k(a)=
49 + a(676 + a(−522 + a(4 + a))
1152M
k(a)=
(1 + a)2(47 − a(2 + a))
1152M
.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Joint proﬁts under full deployment, JPF =1−2kM are lower than
joint proﬁts under no deployment, JPN =1 , and both are independent of a. Joint proﬁts with
M stand-alone ATMs are JPA(a) − kM, where JPA00(a) < 0 and JPA(a) ≤ JPA(e a) for all a
with e a =0 .52461.
If 0 ≤ k<k (0), then k0(a) > 0 ⇒ a∗ is irrelevant and there is full deployment, at equilibrium.
Let a(k) be implicitly deﬁned by k(a)=k.
If k(0) ≤ k<k(0),a>a (k) ⇒ full deployment and a ≤ a(k) ⇒ stand-alone deployment. For
a ≤ a(k),J P A 0(a) > 0 and a(k) ≤ e a. At equilibrium, a∗ = a(k) and there are M stand-alone
ATMs because JPA(a(k)) − kM > JPF.
If k ≥ k(0), no deployment is an equilibrium given that a =0 . Recall that JPN >JPF.
If k>0.13
M , then a∗ =0 , because it induces no deployment and JPA(a) ≤ JPA(e a)=1 .13−kM <
JPN.
If k(e a) ≤ k ≤ 0.13
M (< k(e a)),J P A (e a) ≥ JPN ⇒ at equilibrium, a∗ = e a and there is stand-alone
deployment.
If k(0) ≤ k<k (e a),a>a (k) ⇒ full deployment and a = a(k) ⇒ stand-alone deployment (here,
a(k) maximizes JPA(a)). Recall that a(k) < e a. If k(0) ≤ k<0.04
M , at equilibrium a∗ =0and
there is no deployment because JPA(a(k)) − kM < JPN.
If 0.04
M ≤ k<k (e a), then JPA(a(k)) − kM > JPN and, at equilibrium, a∗ = a(k) and there is
stand-alone deployment.
27Derivation of the socially optimal interchange fee
Lemma 1 The interchange fee that maximizes social welfare (b a), in the ﬁrst stage, under a
surcharging ban.
-I f0 ≤ k<k (0) we have full deployment regardless of a.
- b a>a (k) if k(0) ≤ k ≤ 0.0649
M to induce full deployment.
- b a = a(k) if 0.0649
M <k≤ 0.23
M to induce stand-alone deployment.
-I fk>0.23
M there is no deployment regardless of a.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Total welfare under no deployment, WN = −1
4, and total welfare
under full deployment, WF = 1
4 − 2kM, are both independent of a. Total welfare under
stand-alone (fully asymmetric) deployment is given by WA (a)=g(a) − kM, where g(a)=
[−23+a(2+a)][−19+5a(2+a)]
2304 is strictly decreasing on [0,1]. We have to study the cases where k(0) ≤
k ≤ 0.23
M ,w h e r e0.23
M is the maximum value of k(a), see ﬁgure 1. For k<k (0) and k>0.23
M
welfare does not depend on a. Furthermore, for k ≤ 0.23
M we have that WF >W N. Then, the
problem reduces to compare WA (a) with WN.
If k(0) ≤ k ≤ k(0), the smallest interchange fee such that we have stand-alone deployment is
0.A s WA (0) <W F, b a>a (k) to induce full deployment. If k(0) ≤ k ≤ 0.23
M ,t h es m a l l e s t
interchange fee such that we have stand-alone deployment is a(k),w h e r ea(k) is the smallest
root of k(a)=k.I fk(0) ≤ k<0.0649
M ,a sWF >WA (a(k)), b a>a (k) to induce full deployment.
If 0.0649
M ≤ k ≤ 0.23
M , as WF ≤ WA (a(k)), b a = a(k).
In order to prove Proposition 3, we derive total welfare under diﬀerent surcharging regimes
and compare the results.
Lemma 2 When surcharges are allowed:
(a) If k<0.071
M ,t h e nW = 1
4 − 2kM.
28(b) If 0.071
M ≤ k ≤ 0.188
M , then W = 425
2916 − kM.
(c) If k>0.188
M , then W = −1
4.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . Directly follows from Section 5.2.
Lemma 3 When surcharges are prohibited:
(a) If k< 47
1152M, then W = 1
4 − 2kM.
(b) If 47
1152M ≤ k< 49
1152M and 0.0495835
M ≤ k ≤ 0.13408
M , then W = g(a) − kM, where
g(a)=
(−23 + a(2 + a))(−19 + 5a(2 + a))
2304
,




M , then W = −1
4.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . Directly follows from Section 5.2.






M }, welfare is strictly
larger when surcharges are allowed than when they are prohibited. Welfare is not aﬀected by the
existence of surcharges in any of the following scenarios: k< 47
1152M,k>0.188
M and k = 0.071
M .
Proof of Corollary 1. (a) If k< 47
1152M,there is no deployment with independence of the
existence of surcharges. Hence, welfare is 1
4 − 2kM in both scenarios.
(b) If 47
1152M ≤ k ≤ 49
1152M, welfare is 1
4 − 2kM when surcharges are allowed and g(a) − kM ≤
g(0)−kM when surcharges are banned. Since g(0) = 437
2304, welfare will be larger when surcharges
are allowed than when they are banned.
(c) If 49
1152M <k≤ 0.0495835
M , welfare is 1
4 −2kM when surcharges are allowed and −1
4 when these
are forbidden. Since k ≤ 0.0495835
M , again it will be better for welfare to allow surcharges.
(d) If 0.0495835
M <k<0.071
M , welfare is 1
4 −2kM when surcharges are allowed and g(a)−kM when
these are forbidden. Since in this area a>0.105019 and g(a) is decreasing in a,w e l f a r ew i l lb e
29larger with surcharges than without them. This is because 1
4 − 2kM > g(0.105019) − kM.
(e) If 0.071
M ≤ k ≤ 0.13408
M , welfare is 425
2916 −kM when surcharges are allowed and g(a)−kM when
they are banned. Since now a ≥ 1/3 and stricly larger than 1/3 when k>0.071
M ,w e l f a r ew i l ln o t
be aﬀected by the existence of surcharges if k = 0.071





M , welfare is 425
2916 −kM with surcharges and it is −1
4 without surcharges.
Since k ≤ 0.188
M , welfare will be larger under surcharging.
(g) Finally, if k>0.188
M , welfare is −1
4 with and without surcharges.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Directly follows from Corollary 1.
The model with commitment The proposition below summarizes the results on deploy-
ment.
Proposition 4 At equilibrium,
-i fk>k(a), no ATM is deployed;
-i fk(a) ≥ k ≥ k(a), there are M stand-alone ATMs;






a(72 − 60a + a3)
72M
.
These thresholds are depicted in Figure 3, together with the thresholds that arise under the
original timing, k(a) and k(a).
The case of asymmetric banks. Let us assume that consumers value the bank services at
bank j = A,B by Vj. Without loss of generality, ∆ = VA − VB > 0 i.e. bank A is the favourite
bank (we also impose ∆ < ∆(a)=
23−a(2+a)







Figure 3: Comparison of Deployment Thresholds
When banks are asymmetric enough (∆ > ∆(a)=
1+a(292+a(−282+a(4+a)))
16(1+a)2 ), the multiplicity
of equilibria for intermediate values of the deployment cost disappears: the ATM market is
monopolized by the favourite bank. Tedious calculations similar to those in Proposition 1 lead
to the following result.
Proposition 5 For 0 ≤ k ≤
(1+a)2(47−a(2+a)−16∆)
1152M , both banks install one ATM in each shopping
mall. For
(1+a)2(47−a(2+a)−16∆)
1152M ≤ k ≤
49+676a−522a2+4a3+a4+16(1+a)2∆
1152M bank A installs one ATM
in each shopping mall. For k>
49+676a−522a2+4a3+a4+16(1+a)2∆
1152M , no ATM is deployed.
The case of asymmetric shopping malls Let us call p the probability that a consumer
ends up in the favorite shopping mall. For simplicity, we solve the model for the case M =2
and p ≥ 3
4. Next proposition provides the result.
Proposition 6 If 0 ≤ k ≤
2(26−25p−p2)
729 , every bank installs one ATM in each shopping mall. If
2(26−25p−p2)
729 ≤ k ≤
137−139p+2p2
729 one bank installs two ATMs and the other bank only one ATM
in shopping mall 1. If
137−139p+2p2
729 ≤ k ≤
2(27p−p2)
729 both banks install one ATM in shopping mall
311. For
2(27p−p2)
729 ≤ k ≤
135p+2p2
729 only one bank installs one ATM in shopping mall 1. Finally,
for k>
135p+2p2
729 , no ATM is deployed.
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